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The Rome Treaty for an
International Criminal Court:
A Flawed but Essential
First Step
DOUGLASS CASSEL
Director, Center for International Human Rights
Northwestern University School of Law
or a few fleeting weeks in 1997, the world may have had an opportunity to
bring to justice one of history's bloodiest butchers. Pol Pot led the Khmer
Rouge regime responsible for the slaughter of more than a million Cam-
bodians in the 1970s.' In 1997 the government of Cambodia, unable or unwill-
ing to prosecute him, invited the United Nations to put him on trial.2 But the
UN-fifty years after Nuremberg-still had no criminal court before which to
bring Pol Pot. Although the Security Council had established special courts for
war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, China made clear that it would veto any
UN court for its Khmer Rouge comrade.3
The United States wanted Pol Pot prosecuted but had no legislation clearly
authorizing his trial in the U.S. Washington turned publicly to Canada, which
has such legislation, but Ottawa was not interested. Within a few weeks, the
internal political situation in Cambodia changed. 5 The window of opportunity
closed. Pol Pot was never brought to justice.
Can such a lapse be avoided in the future?
Last summer more than 150 UN member states met in Rome to negoti-
ate a treaty to establish a permanent international criminal court. Following years
of preparatory meetings in New York and five weeks of negotiation in Rome, they
voted 120 to seven, with twenty-one abstentions, for a treaty to establish an Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) to hear future cases of genocide, serious war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Most of the world's democracies-western and
central Europe together with countries like Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa
Winter/Spring 1999 - Volume V, Issue 1
Douglass Cassel
Rica, South Africa and South Korea-supported the ICC. Only two democra-
cies-the U.S. and Israel-voted against, thereby joining the likes of China, Iraq
and Libya.
Before going into effect, the treaty must be ratified by sixty states. Espe-
cially in view of U.S. opposition, that will take years, at minimum. As of this
writing, eighty-one states have signed the treaty, but only two, Senegal and Trinidad
and Tobago, have ratified it.
A product of extensive compromise, the ICC is far from perfect. Most
significantly, it may lack jurisdiction in some cases over atrocities committed by
tyrants against their own peoples. It may also allow too much room for national
governments to delay, obstruct and avoid credible international prosecutions. But
contrary to Washington's objections, the ICC presents little risk of frivolous or
politically motivated prosecutions of U.S. officials or troops deployed abroad in
peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Despite its flaws, the ICC should be
supported as an essential first step.
The Need for a Court
For too many, this has been a century of sorrow. The victim count is numbing. In
addition to those slain on Cambodia's killing fields, civilian victims include 6
million Jews gassed or gunned down by Nazis, millions of peasants starved by
Stalin, nearly 1 million Tutsis hacked to death by Hutus in Rwanda, and over
100,000 indigenous Guatemalans slaughtered by scorched-earth anti-guerrilla
tactics-and these merely illustrate the mass atrocities of our time.
In some countries assassinations have been more selective, targeting indi-
viduals on political grounds. Such victims include more than 10,000 Argentin-
ines, more than 3,000 Chileans, and leaders like Archbishop Oscar Romero in El
Salvador and Steven Biko in South Africa. Countless victims were also tortured,
while survivors were subjected to the psychological torment of having their loved
ones "disappeared."
The continued commission of such crimes-fifty years after Nuremberg
promised "never again"-calls out for an effective ICC. All the more so because
these abominations generally go unpunished. Like Pol Pot, most perpetrators and
most masterminds go free. Idi Amin struts in Saudi Arabia; General Raoul Cedras
lives comfortably in Panama. One survey of the last half-century found no legal
redress whatsoever for gross violations of human rights in 133 of 182 internal
conflicts, including both civil wars and state terror and repression. 9 Where legal
redress is afforded, it is usually scant.'0
Nothing Else Works
Existing institutions have proved as incapable of delivering justice for most crimes
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against humanity as they were in Cambodia. Rarely do nations prosecute their
own malefactors. Not only leaders but followers are almost always shielded from
prosecution, whether by fear, threats, misplaced patriotism, corrupt and ineffi-
cient judicial systems or, when all else fails, by amnesty laws.
Those few countries which do undertake prosecutions are often engaged
in victor's justice, further tainted by unfair procedures, as in Rwanda and Ethio-
pia. Other national prosecutions are incomplete and constrained, as in Argen-
tina, where a handful of junta leaders were prosecuted and then freed after only a
few years in prison.
Nor has prosecution by third-party countries proved reliable. Treaties and,
arguably, customary international law, recognize universal jurisdiction over tor-
ture and disappearances. Yet U.S. and Canadian inability or unwillingness to take
Pol Pot, and the Why did the UN create a court that could
political contro-
versy and mixed and did indict Radovan Karadzik but notjudicial rulings Pol Pot? The answer is simply Chinese
on Britain's de-
tention of Gen- veto power. Whatever the reason in a given
eral Pinochet for case, ad hoc tribunals are simply not
possible extradi- reliable guarantors of justice for the most
tion to Spain,
reveal the vulner- serious international crimes.
ability of prosecution by third-party states. Prospects for such trials are at best
highly uncertain, even for gross offenses and even for offenders who, like Pinochet,
grant themselves amnesties from prosecution at home.
Moreover, while third-state prosecution is preferable as a last resort where
necessary to avoid impunity, the risks of abuse are sobering. Setting all nations
loose to arrest one another's former leaders could inflame international tensions.
International prosecutions, even on an ad hoc basis, are thus better. But
ad hoc courts are not reliably up to the task of international justice. Whatever
their merits on other grounds, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, established
by the winning side in World War II, were tainted by the perception and reality of
victor's justice.
Less partisan are the UN special courts for genocide, serious war crimes
and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. But even
disregarding damaging start-up delays caused by diplomatic and administra-
tive problems, these courts, too, raise questions of selective prosecution. Why
did the UN create a court that could and did indict Radovan Karadzik but
not Pol Pot? The answer is simply Chinese veto power. Why is there a UN
court for ethnic murders in Rwanda but not in neighboring Congo? In part
because by the time of the atrocities in Congo in 1997, the UN was beset by
"tribunal fatigue." Whatever the reason in a given case, ad hoc tribunals are
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simply not reliable guarantors of justice for the most serious international
crimes.
Other international approaches are no substitute for criminal prosecu-
tion. The so-called World Court-the International Court of Justice in The
Hague-hears lawsuits between nations, but does not prosecute individuals. Re-
gional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas hear cases based on indi-
vidual complaints against states, and may order governments to pay damages, but
do not prosecute perpetrators. Truth commissions can help establish broad his-
torical truths, promote national reconciliation, make recommendations and vin-
dicate victims. But they are not courts and do not meet due process standards.
Even where they identify wrongdoers, as in El Salvador, they cannot prosecute
them.
If the most serious of international crimes are to be prosecuted, then, no
vehicle short of a permanent international criminal court is adequate.
What a Court Could Do
An effective ICC could contribute to justice, deterrence, diplomacy, global norms
and, ultimately, to a more humane world. Because of the compromises made in
Rome, time will reveal the extent to which the ICC-assuming it garners the
necessary ratifications-achieves these benefits in practice.
On the most basic level, the ICC could achieve a measure of felt justice
for victims and survivors. This is clearest where states comply with its orders to
arrest suspects, so that the ICC may fairly try and, upon conviction, proportion-
ately punish defendants. Indeed, the political will and capacity to capture many,
if not necessarily all suspects, will be vital to both the perceived effectiveness of
the ICC and the credibility of the international commitment to justice.
But even in cases where the ICC cannot secure the arrest or trial of a
suspect, it may nonetheless achieve meaningful justice for victims. Consider, for
example, the case of former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzik, indicted for
atrocities by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
but who eludes capture because NATO forces are to date unwilling to arrest him.
His mere public indictment by an international tribunal, coupled with his fear to
face its credible judgment, offers a degree of authoritative vindication to victims
and survivors. It makes untenable the lie that they, not he, did wrong.
It also imposes disgrace and punishments short of imprisonment: As an
international fugitive, Mr. Karadzik cannot travel outside his small ethnic en-
clave, for fear of arrest. He has also been removed from office, because the Dayton
Peace Accords demanded at least that much respect for his indictment by a UN
tribunal-a demand eased by his inability to be a negotiator, because he could
not travel to Dayton without being arrested.
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In addition, Mr. Karadzik lives in constant uncertainty; at any moment,
NATO may surprise him. Or his erstwhile colleagues, torn by factionalism, may
betray him. And his Sword of Damocles is perpetual. There is no statute of limi-
tations for crimes against humanity. Just as aging Nazis are put on trial a half-
century after Nuremberg, so too Mr. Karadzik, in some future decade, may yet
find himself in the dock.
The credible prospect of prosecution may also deter some would-be per-
petrators of atrocities. Granted, since there has never been an ICC, there is as yet
no empirical data upon which to prove or disprove its deterrent effect. Fanatics
like the Khmer Rouge will not, in any case, be deterred by a court. But not all
malefactors are madmen.
The potential for deterrence is enhanced by the fact that a credible court
can be a tool in the hands of UN peacekeepers and other international mediators
on the scene. As the former head of Civil Affairs for UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia
during 1992-94 recounts, "We told the local Belgrade and Zagreb authorities
that if they did not act, we would either tell the press or go to a higher authority:
the secretary-general, the Security Council, or some future tribunal....Our inter-
locutors plainly were skeptical that the 'international community' would do any-
thing." He concludes, "Had there been, from the start in Yugoslavia, a high prob-
ability ofjudicial punishment for those who committed crimes against humanity,
there would have been less barbarism.... Those who tried to mitigate some of the
horrors.. .would have found their hand greatly strengthened."
Even where the ICC does not succeed in deterring crimes against human-
ity, it may have helpful diplomatic consequences in their aftermath. The exclu-
sion of indicted Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzik from the Dayton negotia-
tions, and international insistence that he step down as official leader of the Bosnian
Serb entity, were not only made easier by his indictment by the ICTY; they prob-
ably would not have happened without it."
On the other hand, legitimate concern has been expressed that ICC in-
dictments of warring leaders could impede peace negotiations. This concern, how-
ever, is substantially mitigated by the Rome treaty, which grants the UN Security
Council the right to defer ICC investigations and prosecutions for one-year peri-
ods, renewable indefinitely.
Finally, a credible ICC can contribute to raising global normative conscious-
ness. Its very existence will be a constant reminder of the world's supreme moral
condemnation of crimes against humanity. Its every indictment and judgment will
reinforce the message. As a result, public opinion may be sensitized and government
policy options constrained. Simply ignoring atrocities, or bargaining them away in
peace negotiations, will become more difficult. Witness the Clinton Administration's
reluctance even to use the word "genocide" during the Rwandan bloodbath in 1994,
for fear that it might trigger public demands for effective intervention.
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None of these beneficial impacts will guarantee the safety of humanity in
the next century. But together, they could save many lives.
The Rome Treaty
The ICC agreed to in Rome is intended to prosecute "the most serious crimes of
international concern," in cases where national authorities are unable or unwill-
ing to do so. It will be located in The Hague. It will have an independent prosecu-
tor and eighteen judges, three of whom will sit full-time, with others on call as
needed. The ICC will be governed by the state parties to the treaty, and not
directly by the UN. Its funding will come from state parties, possibly supple-
mented by the UN, especially for crimes referred to the ICC by the Security
Council.
Crimes may be referred to the ICC by the Security Council, by a state
party, or by the court's prosecutor on her own initiative, subject to procedural
safeguards. ICC investigations and trials must meet international human rights
standards of due process. For the most heinous crimes, life sentences but not the
death penalty may be imposed. Otherwise the maximum sentence is thirty years,
to be served in a national prison designated by the ICC after taking into account,
among other factors, "widely accepted international treaty standards" for prisons.
ICC Crimes
The ICC will have power to try only crimes committed after it comes into being;
it will thus be a court for the twenty-first and not the twentieth century.
Its initial core jurisdiction will cover genocide, serious war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Compared to current international law, the definitions
of these crimes for purposes of ICC jurisdiction take some steps forward and
some back. The ICC statute accepts the current definition of genocide, that is,
killing and other violent or coercive acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. There was controversy,
however, over US efforts at the February 1999 preparatory commission to further
specify this definition as part of "elements of offenses" for the ICC.14
The ICC statute consolidates recent developments in international law
by defining war crimes to cover both international and internal armed conflicts.
However, especially in internal wars, some crimes now arguably recognized-
such as collective punishments, slavery and starvation of civilians-are omitted
from ICC jurisdiction. Technically they may still be prosecuted by other tribu-
nals, but their omission from the ICC may cause other courts to question their
international legal status.
The ICC statute also helpfully clarifies that crimes against humanity-
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court
widespread or systematic attacks on civilian populations, carried out by specified
violent or coercive means-are not limited to wartime; the ICC can prosecute
such acts committed in peacetime as well. And crimes against humanity expressly
include "enforced disappearance of persons."
Finally, the ICC statute defines gender crimes more explicitly than here-
tofore. Crimes against humanity include "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prosti-
tution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual vio-
lence of comparable gravity"; a similar definition is given for war crimes.
The ICC may also be empowered to prosecute cases of "aggression"-if
and when a definition of this crime can be agreed to and ratified by seven eighths
of the state parties. In addition, seven years after the Rome treaty enters into
effect, international drug trafficking, terrorism and other crimes may be consid-
ered for inclusion, again subject to ratification by seven eighths of the state par-
ties.
Loophole for Dictators?
The Rome treaty leaves a number of questions about the effectiveness of the ICC's
legal design. Two are perhaps most important.
First, the ICC may not always have jurisdiction over crimes committed
by dictators against their own peoples. If the UN Security Council finds a threat
to international peace and security and refers a crime to the ICC, no dictator is
immune. But what if a veto powers blocks referral, as China did in the case of Pol
Pot?
The ICC could still hear the case if it is referred by a state party or the
prosecutor-but only if it has the consent of either the state where the crime
occurred or the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrator.
Consider how the state consent requirement might apply to a future
Saddam Hussein. If he invades Kuwait and commits atrocities there, Kuwait can
give consent for the ICC to hear the case. But what if he commits crimes against
his own people, on Iraqi soil? Then the state of the crime and the state of nation-
ality are one and the same-Iraq, whose leader is unlikely to consent to be hauled
before the ICC. Unless the Security Council steps in and refers the case, our
future Saddam cannot be brought before the ICC.
At first blush, this gap is potentially serious. It is mitigated, however, by
three factors. First, by ratifying the Rome treaty, a state thereby accepts ICC juris-
diction over all the core crimes.15 Thus, if a previous government ratified the
treaty before a Saddam Hussein comes to power, he may remain bound by its16
prior consent. Second, once he leaves power, a successor government may con-
sent to his prosecution, as the Cambodian government did in 1997 for Pol Pot.
Third, if foreign nationals are also victimized, their states may consent to ICC
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jurisdiction. Some seventy Spanish citizens, for example, were among the thou-
sands of victims of General Pinochet's repression in Chile. Not all dictators, then,
can count on escaping the ICC's reach.
Going through the Motions
Another potentially significant flaw in the legal architecture is that the ICC must
defer to national investigations and prosecutions. It cannot take a case referred by
a state party or the prosecutor unless national courts are unable or unwilling to
investigate.
For governments acting in good faith, this makes sense. Why send a Lieu-
tenant William Calley (convicted for the My Lai massacre) to The Hague if he
can be tried at home? For such governments, the less the ICC is used, the more
effective it may be. If the mere potential of its use prods governments to clean
their own houses, the ICC will have accomplished its purpose.
But what about governments acting in bad faith, as one might expect of
regimes guilty of atrocities? If such a government purports to investigate a crime,
the ICC cannot take the case unless the prosecutor can show that the national
proceedings are "for the purpose of shielding" the accused, or were conducted or
delayed in a manner "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice."
Unless a government is foolish enough to conduct a transparently sham
investigation or prosecution, the prosecutor may be hard pressed to prove a pur-
pose to shield, or to negate an intent to do justice. Especially at the outset, all
governments can be expected to plead that they need time to conduct a thorough
investigation. How can the prosecutor prove-in advance-that the investiga-
tion will be a sham?
Once a government acting in bad faith is ceded initial jurisdiction over a
case, it can then be expected to go through the motions, doing just enough to
create a smoke screen of an investigation or prosecution. And in the process, time
will pass, witnesses can be tampered with, and physical evidence lost. By the time
the prosecutor can finally persuade the ICC to step in, she may find it difficult to
pick up the pieces.17
This is a real risk. The ICC's effectiveness may well depend on how much
evidence of bad faith the judges demand of the prosecutor, and how swiftly they
are prepared to pierce a sham.
The United States and the ICC
On the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuremberg trial in 1995, President Clinton
became the first U.S. President to endorse the creation of an ICC. But when the
negotiations culminated in the Rome treaty, the U.S. voted against it.
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Some American opposition is reflexive. Most prominently, Senate For-
eign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms declared that any treaty for an ICC
that might prosecute Americans would be "dead on arrival" on Capitol Hill. No
argument is likely to change his mind. And the rest of the world, of course, will
not agree to an ICC from which Americans are uniquely exempt.
The Clinton Administration position, in part reflecting Pentagon views,
is less rigid but no less adamant. The heart of its concern is that the ICC exposes
U.S. troops on peacekeeping or humanitarian missions overseas, or officials who
authorize them, to potentially politically motivated prosecutions.
Contrary to Pentagon pretensions, however, the US is not uniquely ex-
posed. As of mid-1998 in Bosnia, for example, US troops represented less than
20 percent of NATO forces and only 10 percent of the International Police Task
Force. 19 Yet Britain, France and other NATO nations support the ICC.
The US objection is in any event difficult to sustain in view of the Rome
treaty's extensive safeguards against frivolous or politically motivated prosecu-
tions. First, the prosecutor and judges will be selected not by the UN General
Assembly, but by state parties to the treaty, who will be heavily weighted by de-
mocracies. For example, by April 1999, the seventy-eight signatories to the treaty
included states as Australia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. They did notinclude states
such as China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea or Sudan. 
16
The Rome treaty requires these predominantly democratic states to select
a prosecutor of high competence and extensive practical experience in prosecut-
ing criminal cases and judges of "high moral character, impartiality and integrity"
qualified to sit on their national supreme courts, and competent and experienced
in criminal or international law. A majority vote is required to elect the prosecu-
tor, and a two-thirds vote to elect the judges. This is not a system calculated to
select people prone to frivolous or politically motivated prosecutions.
There are also extensive procedural safeguards. If the Security Council
contemplates referring a case to the ICC, the U.S. can veto it. In cases referred by
states or by the prosecutor on her own motion, before investigating an American,
she must notify the U.S. The U.S. may then undertake its own investigation. If
so, the ICC is precluded from taking the case--even if the U.S. investigation or
trial exonerates the suspect-unless, as discussed above, the prosecutor proves
that the U.S. proceeding is a sham.
Even if the U.S. consented to an ICC investigation, the prosecutor faces
substantive and procedural hurdles. She cannot initiate an investigation unless
first she, and then a three-judge pretrial chamber, finds a "reasonable basis to
proceed." The U.S. can challenge the admissibility of the case before the three-
judge panel and, if necessary, can appeal to a five-judge appeals chamber.
Once the investigation is concluded, the prosecutor cannot take the case
to trial without going before the pretrial chamber again and obtaining a finding
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of "sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person
committed each of the crimes charged."
In short, nothing about the ICC procedures easily lends itself to frivolous
or politically motivated prosecutions. No judicial system can be entirely insulated
• . 20
from such risks, but this one comes close.
Among other objections, the U.S. also protests that American peacekeep-
ers overseas may be subject to ICC jurisdiction even if the U.S. does not ratify the
treaty. That is because, as noted earlier, consent to ICC jurisdiction can be given
either by the nationality state (the U.S. for Americans) or by the state where the
crime takes place. Thus, if a U.S. soldier commits a war crime in Iraq, Iraq can
consent to ICC jurisdiction.
Legally this objection is unimpressive. Today, if a U.S. soldier commits a
war crime in Iraq, he can be prosecuted by Iraq. There is nothing novel about the
state on whose territory a crime takes place exercising jurisdiction over the crime.
And if Iraq can prosecute the criminal in Baghdad, why can it not delegate its
prosecutorial authority to an ICC in The Hague?
Practically the objection is equally dubious. As a practical matter, if a U.S.
soldier is to be prosecuted for a war crime committed in Iraq, would not both he
and the U.S. government vastly prefer that he be tried fairly by the ICC in The
Hague, rather than railroaded by Saddam Hussein's courts in Baghdad?
Washington's real concern here is presumably more subtle: the U.S. would
face little international pressure to turn over an American to Saddam, but might
pay a diplomatic price if it refused
The real U.S. objection boils to turn over an American to the
down to a desire to avoid the ICC. But even this is tenuous, be-
cause the U.S. could block the ICC
embarrassment of having to investigation by simply investigat-
initiate an unwanted ing the case itself. Thus the real U.S.
investigation in Washington. objection boils down to a desire to
avoid the embarrassment of having
to initiate an unwanted investigation in Washington. This objection, so thin that
it is spoken only in corridors, is understandably omitted from public statements
on the ICC.
Constitutional questions have also been raised by members of Congress
and by commentators, for example, whether trial of an American civilian before
ICC judges would violate the U.S. constitutional right of trial by jury. While
such questions are ultimately for the Supreme Court, the Departments of State
and Justice have raised no constitutional impediments to the Rome treaty.
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Conclusion
The ICC is far from ideal. Its coverage is incomplete and its powers constrained.
Time will tell how effective its current legal design will be in practice. But it is an
essential first step toward international justice in a world where national justice
has failed. It merits support, and all governments should be pressed to cooperate
with it.
U.S. objections to the ICC, and our consequent isolation from nearly every
other democracy in the world, may fairly be viewed as due above all to the hubris
of superpower. Disappointing but not surprising, these quibbles are cut from the
same cloth as Washington's lonely opposition to other widely supported and use-
ful treaties, such as the conventions against land mines and on the rights of the
child. The near certainty that the U.S. will not ratify the Rome treaty during the
Clinton Administration, or during the tenure of Chairman Jesse Helms, should
not preclude American participation in some more enlightened future. No sig-
nificant national interest weighs against joining the ICC, and the call of human-
ity counsels in favor. 0
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